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Abstract: Is it possible to prepare oneself to become a Christian? For 
Kierkegaard, there is no straightforward answer to this question, especially since 
such a transition depends upon a divine activity that is outside the realm of human 
control. Despite the challenge that this question poses, Kierkegaard’s writings do 
provide us with a way to respond, and this response will be the subject matter of 
this paper. Following an analysis of his position, this paper will conclude that, 
although Kierkegaard recognizes that there are precedent ways of existing that 
are more conducive to becoming a Christian, it is not helpful to describe them as 
preparatory. 
 
When a person undergoes a transformative experience, she finds herself existing in a way that 
she could not possibly have anticipated in advance of undergoing that experience. With 
transformation comes a new orientation to the world and, indeed, a new self-understanding. 
This raises a difficult question. How can a person prepare for the kind of existence that will 
result from a transformative experience? To address this question, we first need to think about 
the particular nature of the transformative experience that faces a person. Different 
transformative experiences raise their own distinctive challenges when it comes to addressing 
this question.1 The particular transformative experience that I shall be focusing on is Christian 
conversion. More specifically, I am going to think about how Søren Kierkegaard would 
respond to the question of whether a person can prepare to become a Christian. 
 As I seek to show, Kierkegaard does not think that conversion takes place by way of a 
specific, clear-cut experience.2 For Kierkegaard, ‘[c]onversion goes slowly’ (JP 1, 420 / SKS 
27, 207). It is comparable to the transformation that a husband and wife experience in a 
marriage. Like marriage, the Christian life requires a person to commit her life to another 
person, to Jesus Christ; it requires her to commit herself prayerfully, imaginatively, and 
passionately to following Jesus Christ. By so doing, a person commits her life to another, 
without knowing all that this will entail, and without knowing what kind of person she will 
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become within the covenant of this relationship. It is in the context of a committed relationship 
with Jesus Christ that a person begins to discover what it is like to participate in a life of faith. 
And when this happens in truth (in a way that corresponds to the divine truth that Jesus Christ 
mediates to the world), it involves what Laurie Paul refers to as ‘an extended transformative 
experience’. (Paul (2014), 97).3 Over an extended period of time, a person will be delivered 
into a new life that she could not possibly have anticipated in advance of becoming a Christian.  
What is more, for Kierkegaard, the essential condition of this transformative experience 
is encountering the active presence of God in her life. To become a Christian, a person needs 
to be reborn from above, according to the witness of the Spirit (John 3:3-8). ‘Christian rebirth’ 
involves ‘a relationship not between man and man but between God and man’; it involves a 
relationship, which he refers to as ‘a new creation’ (JP 1, 649:19 / SKS 27, 396). The idea that 
Christian transformation requires God to be graciously at work in a person’s life raises a whole 
new set of challenges when it comes to addressing the question, “can a person prepare to 
become a Christian?”. This essay will explore some of the ways in which Kierkegaard 
negotiates these challenges. 
By addressing this issue, this essay will also respond to Ingolf Dalferth’s recent 
criticism of Kierkegaard, in which he claims that, for Kierkegaard, we ‘have to prepare 
ourselves for, or at least become prepared for the workings of grace or we shall miss it’. 
(Dalferth (2005), 279).4 While I recognize that there is a deep ambiguity in Kierkegaard’s 
argument that can invite such a claim, I also think that such ambiguity is to be expected when 
reflecting on the mysterious ways in which God relates to human beings in time. That said, I 
do not think that this ambiguity invites Dalferth’s conclusion. As I reflect on whether 
Kierkegaard believes that a person can prepare to become a Christian, I shall defend 
Kierkegaard against Dalferth’s reading of him. Additionally, I shall also challenge the 
misperception that Kierkegaard views Christian conversion as an existential process of self-
transformation,5 rather than a process of transformation that takes place in a reciprocal 
relationship with God. 
 
On being ready for the unexpected 
 
Before turning to Kierkegaard, I want to turn briefly to consider Donald MacKinnon’s 
reflections on the French Post-impressionist painter, Paul Cézanne. The reason for doing so is 
that MacKinnon’s discussion of Cézanne offers a distinctive example of someone undergoing 
a transformation in a way that reflects certain aspects of Kierkegaard’s account of Christian 
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conversion. In particular, it gives us some insight into what it might mean for a person to 
prepare for the unexpected. 
In his reflection of Cézanne, MacKinnon points out that it would have been impossible 
for Cézanne to experience and perceive the world in the way that he did had he not ‘been the 
painter that in fact he was’ (Mackinnon (1974), 107). It was in and through devoting himself 
to achieving the post-impressionist vision of art, which he was to embody, that Cézanne’s 
‘perceptual experience achieved [a] complexity and subtlety’ that distinguished him from the 
‘less disciplined and less creative spirits’ (Ibid., 107). 
Now, amongst these ‘less disciplined and less creative spirits’, we would have to 
include the younger Cézanne: that is, we would have to include Cézanne prior to his becoming 
the insightful post-impressionist painter that he later became. Cézanne was not born with a 
complex and subtle perceptiveness. Rather, he cultivated it through an extended period of 
discernment, which took his perception beyond its more pedestrian form. By drawing on the 
example of Cézanne, MacKinnon concludes that we must not become too comfortable with 
our standard perception of reality. We must learn ‘to be ready for the unexpected’, and this 
means developing an attitude that is ‘uncongenial’ to those who are set in their ways.6 We must 
become open to discerning more than that which is immediately apparent. By so doing, we 
allow ourselves to become transformed in and through our engagement with the surrounding 
world. 
Cézanne’s readiness for the unexpected required a perceptiveness that kept him from 
becoming bound to immediacy, from getting caught up in the regularities of earthly life, from 
synchronising with the pulse of the crowd. And it involved an enchantedness with which he 
came to interpret reality as having a brilliance that is not immediately apparent, on the surface. 
This discernment is what stopped Cézanne from settling into the uniformity of the natural 
world. 
What makes Cézanne’s discernment comparable to Christian discernment is that they 
are both characterized by a readiness for the unexpected, and an awareness of the transcendent, 
which resists the pull to become a cog in the machinations of the world––to become a mere 
feature of nature. The difference, however, is that, for Kierkegaard, Christian discernment is 
contingent upon the transcendent and unexpected one (God) establishing kinship with a person 
in time. By so doing, God enables a relationship with the transcendent that would have been 
beyond the reach of Cézanne’s own imagination. What is more, while the Christian might not 
be content with settling into the ways of the world, she can find contentment by settling into a 
relationship with God. The restless imagination of Cézanne (qua painter) can never find such 
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contentment. This is because the sense of transcendence that shaped Cézanne’s artistry never 
relates him to the transcendent in the way that faith relates the Christian to the God who makes 
himself known. In Cézanne’s search, the transcendent is always beyond the horizon of what he 
comes to know. Consequently, he can never find the sense of fulfilment (in his life as an artist) 
that the Christian enjoys in covenant relationship with God.7 
For the purposes of this essay, I want to introduce an important qualification here. 
Being ready for the unexpected does not mean being mentally prepared for the unexpected. It 
cannot mean this. If one were able to prepare oneself mentally for the unexpected, there would 
need to be a sense in which the unexpected was not the unexpected. One can only mentally 
prepare for something if one has some awareness of that something prior to experiencing it––
that is, if one has some idea of what to expect. 
So, for example, on the one hand, there would seem to be plenty of things that a person 
can do to prepare to become a mother (there is even a well-known book entitled What to Expect 
When You’re Expecting). On the other hand, a person cannot prepare for those things that are 
to be unexpected, such as those existential qualities that result from the transformative 
experiences of actually becoming a mother (assuming that becoming a mother is, in some way, 
a transformative experience––and most mothers will tell you that it is).  
To be ready for the unexpected is to be continually open, not only to discovering new 
features of reality, but also to having the very nature of one’s perception transformed; it is to 
be ready and open to being taken beyond one’s immediate perception. Again, as we shall now 
see, there is an extent to which Kierkegaard recognizes that a similar attitude is conducive to 
becoming a Christian in a way that a closed-mindedness is not. That said, as I contend, it is 
unhelpful to view such an attitude as preparatory for becoming a Christian. 
 
Does Kierkegaard think that a person can prepare to become a Christian? 
 
For Kierkegaard, there is a sense in which becoming a Christian requires a readiness for the 
unexpected. He believes that there are certain things that a person can do that may ready a 
person to become a Christian: for example, praying, reading the bible, listening to the witness 
of a believing Christian.8 He also recognizes that the particular dynamics of subjective human 
existence can have a pivotal role to play in readying a person to become a Christian. For 
example, he suggests that a person’s passionate disposition––‘the thoughts of the heart’––have 
a decisive role in determining whether or not a person will come to faith (PC, 96 / SKS 12, 
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105).9 And there are some features of this disposition that resemble Cézanne’s readiness for 
the unexpected.  
Yet, on the other hand, he also understands that neither a person’s practices nor her 
particular subjective existence can, in and of themselves, prepare a person for being 
transformed into a life of faith and the perception this will generate. Any readiness that a person 
might achieve cannot know what to expect upon becoming a Christian. So, while there may be 
certain things that a person can do to increase the likelihood of becoming a Christian, these 
things will not prepare her for the entirely new quality of life that she will experience upon 
being transformed by the presence of God in time. 
Some helpful illustrations of this point are provided by Laurie Paul. She notes, in one 
of her examples, that undergoing surgery to receive cochlear implants, and being in possession 
of the necessary medical conditions to receive the surgery, may provide the circumstances that 
will enable a person to be able to hear for the first time. However, they will certainly not, in 
and of themselves, prepare a person for the first-personal experience of hearing for the first 
time. 
But there is also a critical difference here. It is likely that the person who is going to 
receive cochlear implants will be able to know, in advance, that she is ready to go through the 
process that will enable her to hear for the first time. However, for Kierkegaard, a person 
cannot know, in advance, that she is ready to become a Christian. A person can only know 
retrospectively that she was ready to become a Christian because she has become a Christian. 
Upon becoming a Christian, a person rejoices in the fact that she has been transformed by 
encountering the grace of God in her life; she rejoices in the fact that her life, in all its 
irreducible subjectivity, has been drawn into relationship with God. 
This, however, is a simplification of Kierkegaard’s position. So, now, I want to take 
some time to think more deeply about his understanding of Christian conversion. The limited 
focus of this essay will not allow for a close analysis of the detailed and careful way in which 
Kierkegaard responds to the question of how a person becomes a Christian. However, I shall 
offer an account of what I think are the essential elements in his discussion of conversion. 
First, for Kierkegaard, a person cannot straightforwardly think herself into a 
qualitatively different sphere of existence, nor can she directly transition [Overgang] into it 
through sheer willpower because, in advance of her existing in it, there will be a sense in which 
it will be totally alien to her.10 To transition into such a sphere, for Kierkegaard, a person needs 
to set out on a pathos-filled venture into the unknown.11 And, to make a complete transition, 
or conversion, she must take a leap [Spring]––a ἁ ἰ ἄ έ (shifting from one 
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genus to another). This leap requires her to risk allowing herself to become transformed into a 
new way of existing.12 
How, then, might a person involve herself in a process of conversion? To make this 
leap, a person will need to have some idea of where she is venturing. To become a Christian, a 
person needs to have some awareness of Christianity in advance of having any clarity as to what 
it actually means to be a Christian. However, while a prior awareness of Christianity is required, 
such awareness does not provide a person any direct access to the essential truth of Christianity. 
This is because, for Kierkegaard, a person can only truly relate to the truth of Christianity, to 
God, in and through a life of faith. A person cannot know what Christianity is, in truth, until 
she becomes a Christian.13 And, for this to happen, a person needs to be transformed by 
encountering the grace of God in her life. Therefore, studying Scripture and Christian doctrine 
will not directly bring a person into a personal relationship with the reality of God.14 It is the 
God who assumes human nature who is the all-transforming and irreducibly personal focus of 
the Christian faith. Therefore, a prior awareness of Christianity can only serve as the occasion 
for God to encounter that person and reconcile her into a life of faith. (See PF, 11 / SKS 4, 220). 
 
Johannes Climacus on becoming a Christian 
 
At this point, it can become quite difficult to work out how Kierkegaard thinks that a person 
can relate herself to the truth of Christianity. Indeed, Kierkegaard does not offer a precise 
answer to this question. His deep respect for the uncertainty of God’s activity holds him back 
from providing an overly systematic account of how a person relates herself to the truth of 
Christianity. However, his non-Christian pseudonym, Johannes Climacus, is willing to offer a 
more systematic engagement with this question.  
Climacus is described as an ‘outsider’ to the Christian faith, but an outsider who is 
preoccupied by the question ‘How can I, Johannes Climacus, become a Christian?’.15 As a non-
Christian trying to think about this question, Climacus does not show the same kind of caution 
that we see in Kierkegaard. He comes across as being more speculative and methodical in his 
thinking than Kierkegaard. Yet, as we shall see, he is also clear that becoming a Christian 
depends upon the power and presence of God in time––and, according to Christianity, God is 
not someone who can be incorporated into any world-historical system of understanding. 
Climacus supposes that, to become a Christian,16 a person must approach the idea of 
God, or the idea of Christianity, with an existential pathos. She must approach this idea 
passionately, as someone who believes that she has nothing to offer except her need of God. 
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(See CUP, 556-557, 581-582 / SKS 7, 505-506, 529). Going through these motions will not 
itself bring a person any closer to God. However, such motions can provide the ‘impetus’ for 
God then, in response (or in ‘second place’ [secundo loco]), to deliver that person from her 
sinful life into a life of faith––from a life in untruth to a life in truth (CUP, 559-560 / SKS 7, 
508-509; see also JFY, 191 / SKS 16, 237-238). Climacus writes: ‘the god [Guden] rescues 
from delusion the person who in quiet inwardness and honest before God is concerned for 
himself; even though he is ever so simple, the god leads him in the suffering of inwardness to 
the truth’ (CUP, 615 / SKS 7, 559).17 In this passage we can see that, even when Climacus is 
stressing the subjective side of Christianity, he remains adamant that it is God who draws a 
person into relationship with the truth. When God is present in a person’s life, in a way that 
brings about transformation, Climacus notes that there occurs a ‘break with immanence’ (CUP, 
571 / SKS 7, 519). 
This break with immanence, as M. Jamie Ferreira makes so clear, does not cause a 
person to lose continuity with herself, in every sense (Ferreira (2010), 6-24). In conversion, a 
person’s humanity is not displaced; rather, it is transformed, heightened, and deepened (ibid. 
19-21). Nevertheless, according to his understanding of Christianity, Climacus does not think 
that a person can transform herself into a life of faith. For Climacus, there is nothing inherent 
to a person’s worldly existence that can enable her to deliver herself into the Christian faith. 
He understands that the Christian life is grounded in an encounter with ‘God in time as an 
individual human being’, who exists as ‘something outside himself’ (CUP, 561n., 556 / SKS 
7, 510n., 506).18 The grace of God breaks into a person’s life, as a spiritual activity that comes 
to her from beyond her own immanence––thereby causing a break in the natural course of her 
existence (CUP, 610 / SKS 7, 553). For Climacus, it is a particular historical relation to God 
in time that inspires a new Christian pathos (‘a pathos of separation’) with which God upbuilds 
a person in her faith (CUP, 582, 556-559 / SKS 7, 530, 505-508): a pathos that, given its 
absolutely different source of inspiration, must be recognized as qualitatively different from 
the universally accessible pathos that can be discovered by the inner workings of the human 
mind.19 The point of departure for becoming a Christian is thus a living relationship with God 
in history (CUP, 579, 583-584 / SKS 7, 526, 530-531). And this depends wholly upon a 
decisive ‘moment’ in which God encounters and reveals himself to a person in a way that 
transforms that person to relate to God in truth (PF, 13 / SKS 4, 222). 
The ‘moment’ is key to understanding Climacus’s understanding of Christianity. The 
limited scope of this paper will not allow for a comprehensive treatment of this issue (as it is 
considered, for example, in Philosophical Fragments). However, what I will say is that 
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Climacus’s emphasis on the role of the ‘moment’ is closely connected with Kierkegaard’s 
critique of Hegelianism. The moment, for him, is a point in time in which the eternal God 
encounters an historical person from beyond time. With this paradoxical understanding, 
Climacus ensures that he does not collapse the eternal God into the world-historical process. 
For Climacus, God (and, therefore, a relationship that includes God) cannot be contained 
within the natural order. The God of Christianity remains free, unconstrained by the limits of 
the natural order. As such, every moment in which a person encounters God in time is made 
possible because God freely decides to encounter that person in time. While Kierkegaard’s 
understanding of time warrants its own discussion and evaluation, it is helpful to note that 
Kierkegaard does not think that God exists within the contingent order. To put it in non-
Kierkegaardian terms, he believes that God is lord over creation history rather than subject to 
it. As such, each and every moment of God’s engagement with history, and with everything in 
history, is always freely determined by the eternal God.20  
In short, when God transforms a person within history, from beyond history, an event 
occurs that is beyond what is possible for a person on her own, in her own immanent history. 
By the grace of God, a person is given to participate in a new history of relationship with God. 
In this event, as Climacus puts it strongly, ‘every remnant of original immanence is annihilated, 
and all connection cut away’ (CUP, 572, 576 / SKS 7, 520, 523). God confronts a person 
miraculously in a way that causes that person, in this respect, to ‘lose continuity with himself’ 
and become ‘a new creation’ (CUP, 576 / SKS 7, 524). 
In what sense, then, does a person both lose and maintain continuity with himself? In 
and through the process of conversion, for Climacus, a person continues to exist as the 
historical subject he has always been. However, when God reconciles him into a life of faith, 
his subjective history no longer remains closed to God. To put it in Climacus’s terms, a 
person’s original existence––in which he sinfully closes himself off to God––‘is annihilated’ 
(CUP, 572, 576 / SKS 7, 520, 523).21 In faith, a person finds that God has opened him up to 
participate in a reciprocal relationship with God, and thus opened him up to the possibility of 
being transformed within this relationship.22 This means that any historical knowledge of 
Christianity, or any passionate interest in Christianity, which is prior to this transformation, 
can only ever be preliminary. If a person’s existence is closed to God, it is not able to relate to 
God in truth. Therefore, a person’s initial vision (her closed and unfaithful vision) of what 
Christianity can only ever be a projection of his ‘pagan’ understanding (CUP, 201, 293-294, 
606 / SKS 7, 184, 267, 551). 
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Kierkegaard on becoming a Christian 
 
While Climacus and Kierkegaard relate to Christianity in very different ways,23 it is fair to say 
that they share a very similar understanding of what Christianity is. For Kierkegaard, the 
Christian does not merely relate to God by learning about revelation from her Bible and then 
struggling to correspond to it. Becoming a Christian clearly presupposes that this will happen. 
However, Christian transformation relies on an outward relationship with God: with God who 
‘cannot be an object for [human] beings, because God is subject’ (KJN 73 / SKS 20, 74; see 
also JP 2, 1449 / SKS 26, 281). It involves the transformation of a person by way of a spiritual 
activity that comes to her from beyond her own existence, from beyond a preacher’s Sunday 
sermon, and, indeed, from beyond the pages of her Bible.24 Kierkegaard insists that we ‘always 
need grace beforehand’ (JP 2, 1493 / SKS 25, 223). 
Kierkegaard also thinks that Jesus Christ is not merely a historical figure who leaves 
behind information that can serve to fill in the blanks in a person’s immanent relation to God. 
Rather, Christ is the God-human ‘mediator’ in and through whom all persons can be drawn into 
a relationship with God, by the power of the Spirit.25 Consequently, it is not merely 
Christological or evangelical information that makes Christianity qualitatively unique, but the 
way in which the power of God in time actively enables a person to relate to God. So, it is not 
the case that once the Christian has accepted the Gospel message, she can then mediate the truth 
of Christianity to herself, in isolation from the presence of God. The only way whereby the 
Christian relates to the eternal truth, and continues to do so, is through a living relationship with 
God. On this account, it is not a person’s passionate commitment to Christian teaching that is 
central, but rather, God’s sustaining that person in her faith, thereby enabling her to relate both 
to God personally and thus to the truth that God is in himself.26 
Grace, for Kierkegaard, does not simply perfect a person’s natural existence; it 
transforms it. Prior to becoming a Christian, a person cannot know what to expect. There is no 
prospective continuity, and there is no possibility of a person predetermining the condition of 
God’s engagement with him. A person cannot methodically summon the grace of God into his 
life, and thereby use God to deliver himself into a life of faith.27 Unlike immanent forms of 
religiousness, it is not the case in Christianity that ‘[w]hen a person rubs it [the wonderful lamp 
of freedom] with ethical passion, God comes into existence for him’ (CUP, 138 / SKS 7, 129).28 
Becoming a Christian involves a free subject to free subject relationship that may require a 
person to be patient in his passion to know God (see KJN 5, 124-125 / SKS 21, 119). Any 
existential continuity, therefore, can only be discerned retrospectively and in such a way that 
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God’s mediatory, transformative and redemptive activity is understood to be both foundational 
and also unanticipatable. When a person is transformed by grace, he no longer relates naturally 
to God as if God were a conceptual postulate, an existential goal, or an object of his imagination.  
Does this mean that the Christian is required to forget what it means to exist as a human 
being? No, by being drawn into relationship with God (the eternal truth), the Christian is given 
to know in truth what it means to be human, and to be so before the God who creates and 
sustains her. For Kierkegaard, a person discovers her humanity when her existence corresponds 
to the power that created her.29 She discovers her humanity by coming to know the God before 
whom she stands. And she comes to know this, in truth, by the grace of God (see PF, 46 / SKS 
4, 252). 
So, what can be said about whether a person can ready herself to become a Christian? 
To come to faith in God, Climacus suggests, a person must loosen her grip on her desire to see 
God demonstrated to her directly; she needs to let go of the priority she gives to her own 
immediate understanding and imagination. As he puts it, she needs to ‘let go of the 
demonstration’ in a ‘leap’ that he describes as meine Zuthat (my contribution) (PF, 42-43 / SKS 
4, 248). By ‘letting go’, a person resists the temptation to try to work God out in her own terms 
before turning to God for relationship. She becomes ready for the unexpected and submits 
herself to God, humbly placing her trust in God for everything. 
For Kierkegaard, the venturing or willingness that characterizes the leap does not in 
itself prepare a person to know God. As Murray Rae notes, the leap that a person contributes 
‘is more aptly defined as the removal of an obstacle to conversion. That obstacle is human 
pretence––the pretence that reason or the understanding enables us to attain the Truth on our 
own.’ (Rae (1997), 166).30 To be clear, by seeking to set aside one’s own pretence, a person 
does not positively prepare herself to become a Christian. It simply makes her more open for 
the unexpected: it makes her more open to the possibility of encountering something for which 
she cannot prepare herself; and it makes her more open to the possibility that her immediate 
perception of reality might be confused. For Kierkegaard, it would seem that such openness 
makes a person’s existence more conducive to becoming a Christian.  
This seems right. If, for example, an atheist, such as Richard Dawkins, were less 
confident in his own capacity to understand the nature of reality, and more open to the 
possibility of God’s existence, it would seem fair to say that he would be more likely to become 
a Christian. Or, to put it another way, such humility would seem to increase the likelihood of 
him participating in the kind of occasion that is conducive to becoming a Christian: such as an 
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occasion of prayer, attending a Church service, or listening to the witness of a believing 
Christian. 
But, again, prospectively, a person cannot know that she is open to the grace of God. 
She can only know retrospectively that she was open to God, because she has become a 
Christian. A person knows that she is blessed because she has been given the eyes to see and 
the ears to hear (Matt. 13:16). And, when this happens, the Christian does not boast of her own 
ability to open herself to God, but boasts of the grace of God, which drew (and is drawing) her 
into a life of faith. The Christian does not boast of the capacity of her own “flesh and blood” to 
perceive the truth of Gospel message, but of the revelation of the “Father who is in heaven” 
(Mt. 16:17). 
When a person turns to the God who she does not yet know, she awaits a transformative 
experience that is very different from the transformative experience that might take place in a 
marriage between equals, or that a parent might experience when raising a child––to refer to 
Laurie Paul’s examples.31 If anything, she awaits an experience that is comparable to the 
transformative experience that an infant might come to experience when kept in a loving 
relationship by a parent. In this relationship, the infant comes to know the parent she did not 
immediately have the ability to know. The reason for this is that the relationship with God––
which undergirds Christian conversion––is not chosen or maintained in the way that a person 
might be able to choose or maintain a relationship with a spouse or a child. While there are 
choices that need to be made to become a Christian, for Kierkegaard, the Christian does not 
have the freedom to realize the relationship with God for herself. A person cannot simply 
commit herself to a known set of circumstances by which she can know that she will undergo 
the transformative experience that takes place in a relationship with God. Instead, she must trust 
that God will draw her to himself and keep her in this relationship, transforming her in ways 
that she cannot even begin to understand. 
Kierkegaard does not know the mind of God. Again, for this reason, he does not attempt 
to offer a systematic explanation as to why there are certain dynamics within the contingent 
order that can increase the likelihood of a person becoming a Christian. Nonetheless, he does 
assume that this is case. For him, if we do not acknowledge that human agency has a pivotal 
role in the process of ‘becoming a believer’, we end up with ‘a fatalistic understanding of 
election by grace’ (KJN 6, 420-421 / SKS 22, 415). Rather than human beings being the variable 
in deciding whether or not a person becomes a Christian, God becomes the variable. And this 
is not an option for Kierkegaard. As such, it is somewhat understandable why Dalferth would 
criticize Kierkegaard for suggesting that a person can prepare for the workings of grace. Yet 
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Dalferth’s criticism is also somewhat uncharitable. Prospectively, Kierkegaard does not think 
that a person can know what it means to prepare to become a Christian––let alone actually 
prepare herself to make this happen. No human mind has an inside knowledge that can know 
precisely how, when, why, or whether God will draw a person into the Christian life. 
Kierkegaard’s theological vision simply does not have the self-confidence to assume that 
human beings possess an intentional command over the workings of grace.  
There is something else that is worth mentioning here, which may further clarify 
Kierkegaard’s own position. As Murray Rae points out, ‘the leap’ is a Climacean category; this 
category, he notes, ‘is almost completely absent from the writings of the so-called Christian 
authors, Anti-Climacus and Kierkegaard himself’ (Rae (1997), 22). That is, ‘the leap’ is the 
generic category of a non-Christian who is pondering how to become a Christian. Kierkegaard 
does not make the same use of the leap. When Kierkegaard looks back over his life as a 
Christian, he does not recount the leaps that he made to become a Christian. Rather, he speaks 
of God’s governance (Styrelse) that supported him ‘indescribably much’ (KJN 5, 243 / SKS 21, 
233). He speaks of the Holy Spirit who gives faith (FSE, 81 / SKS, 13, 103). And he speaks of 
the love of God made known to the world in Jesus Christ: 
 
Lord Jesus Christ, you who loved us first, you who until the last, loved those 
whom you had loved from the beginning, you who until the end of time continue 
to love everyone who wants to belong to you––your faithfulness cannot deny 
itself. Alas, only when a person denies you can he force you, so to speak, you the 
loving one, also to deny him. (CD, 282 / SKS 10, 103). 
 
Conclusion 
 
When becoming a Christian, for Kierkegaard, a person trusts and hopes that God is at work in 
her life; she must ‘believe in a providentia specialissima [special providence]’ (JP 2, 2083 / 
SKS 26, 241). However, she cannot know this with certainty, nor can she have any command 
over God’s activity. Indeed, for Kierkegaard, there is a sense in which a person cannot even 
know for certain whether she has actually become a Christian––insofar as she cannot directly 
see God delivering her into a life of faith. So, becoming a Christian is not as clear-cut as hearing 
for the first time with the help of cochlear implants. To an extent, it is more comparable to 
getting married or achieving a post-impressionist vision of art. However, it is even less clear-
cut than these experiences because it depends upon a spiritual activity that comes to a person 
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mysteriously, from beyond her subjective experience of the world and, indeed, from beyond 
the surface phenomena of this world. This activity can only be known by the eyes of faith 
[Troens Øie], and even these eyes are having to look through a glass darkly (1 Cor. 13:12; see 
JP 4, 3916 / SKS 27, 303). 
So, when considering whether he himself is a Christian, Kierkegaard notes: ‘[I] aspire 
to it, fight for it, pray about it, and trust to God I am a Christian’ (PV, 129 / SKS 16, 111). 
However, out of his deep respect for Christianity, he is trepidatious about asserting his status 
as a Christian.32 He explains: ‘to say about oneself that one is a Christian means to speak with 
God, and that therefore a human being must speak with fear and trembling’ (PV, 140 / SKS 16, 
122). The problem with certainty is that it intimates that a subject has a command over her 
relationship with the object of her knowing; it suggests a form of command that is not proper 
to a faithful relationship with God. Genuine faith in God is characterized by a humble 
recognition of the incompleteness and provisionality of one’s beliefs: a recognition that keeps 
a person turning to God for upbuilding in the struggle to become a Christian. 
 We can see, therefore, why Kierkegaard would resist the suggestion that a person can 
prepare to become a Christian. His appreciation for the uncertainty of faith does not concur with 
the suggestion that grace can be anticipated in the mind of a person who is thinking about 
becoming a Christian. Again, while he is happy to acknowledge that there are human practices 
and mindsets that seem pivotal for becoming a Christian, he does not present them in any 
straightforward way as conscious preparation for the miracle and mystery of grace. Not for a 
moment does he think that a person is privy to (let alone able to prepare herself for) the way 
that God works in the world. What Kierkegaard does affirm, albeit unsystematically, is that a 
humble and passionate interest in a personal relationship with the living God is conducive to 
becoming a Christian in a way that a speculative or inward-looking analysis of Christianity is 
not. 
What is central for Kierkegaard is not a theory of conversion but the reality to which 
conversion corresponds. This reality, the reality of grace, is not something to be passively 
observed, systematized, naturalized, or domesticated. Grace is not to be introduced ‘as a matter 
of course’––a mere step in the process of coming to faith––‘which, after all, means that it 
[grace] is taken in vain’ (PV, 16 / SKS 13, 24). It is present as an activity that comes from 
beyond human existence to draw persons to embrace God wholeheartedly with a humble and 
loving adoration. And whether grace draws a person into a personal relationship with the God, 
‘depends on whether it so pleases God’ (JP 2, 1452 / SKS 26, 345). That being said, a person 
can trust that God lovingly wills to draws all persons to himself, and so the person who seeks 
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God can hope and trust that she will come to find the grace of God working in her life (Mt. 7:7; 
Lk. 11:9). 
To conclude, for Kierkegaard, the Christian’s story of her conversion is not to be told 
as a story of her own existential adventure, or of her own transformative experience. Rather, it 
is to be told as the story of God drawing that person to himself, in and through the person of 
Jesus Christ, and, indeed, through the power of the Holy Spirit. The story of Christian 
conversion is to be told as the story of God finding that person in the wilderness. It is not a 
story of how a person prepared herself to find God in the wilderness. 
Of course, the story of a person’s conversion can be narrated in either way. But, for 
Kierkegaard, one way is faithful and the other is not. In retrospect, for the Christian, the story 
of conversion is a story of God’s governance, the story of God’s faithfulness; it is not the story 
of an imaginative person, but the story of the mediator, the high priest, who graciously delivers 
a person across a chasm that would otherwise be uncrossable or, we might say, unleapable. 
So the Christian must resist the temptation to start the story of her conversion with “I”: 
“I grew up in a Christian home”, “I went to a Christian camp”, “I found God at a particularly 
difficult time in my life”. If a Christian begins in that way, she must quickly pause and correct 
herself with the Apostle Paul’s words “yet not I” [ouk egō de], and confess that her conversion 
is enabled by “the grace of God that is with me” (1 Cor. 15:10).33 
But why would the Christian confess that her faith is grounded in the grace of a God 
who is hidden from view? Would this not convey to the (secular) world that she is a blind 
fideist––someone committed to the activity of an invisible being? For Kierkegaard, the 
Christian does this because it is a part of her faithful calling to recognize and confess that God 
has spoken to her––that God has called her out of her confusion into a life that is devoted to 
the living God. Any temptation to reduce this calling to the ramblings of her own imagination 
would be to prompt a forgetfulness of her calling. It would be to deny the reality of God, and 
turn her own idea of God into the object of her faith. Furthermore, it would be to disregard the 
one true grounding of the Christian faith––the God who delivers a person into a life of truth. 
So, for Kierkegaard, the Christian must always testify that God prepares her to become a 
Christian in a way that she could never do for herself. 
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Notes 
1 For example, in her recent book, Transformative Experience, Laurie Paul offers an array of distinctive reflections 
on the various transformative experiences that she considers: such as becoming a vampire, becoming a mother, 
or getting cochlear implants that will enable her to hear for the first time. Each of these circumstances have their 
own unique dynamics, but they also each face the same difficulty, a difficulty that I am considering in this paper. 
How can a person make an informed choice about whether or not to undergo a transformative experience? 
2 As such, conversion is significantly dissimilar to the ‘immediate, sharp transitions’ that occur when being bitten 
by a vampire, having a child, or receiving cochlear implants––to the ‘special cases where the transformative nature 
of the experience is easily identifiable’. (Paul (2014), 104). In contrast to these experiences, Paul also devotes 
time to considering transformative experiences that ‘involve change that occurs over a period of time, or occurs 
in the distant future from the time at which you must make the decision to act’. She writes: ‘In this way, ordinary 
approaches towards central, life-defining choices, like the choice to get married, the choice to adopt and parent a 
young child into adulthood, and the choice of a career, can involve transformative choices. Here, you must make 
a choice that affects your temporally extended self, a choice to initiate an experience that lasts for months or years, 
or your current time slice must make a choice that determines the lived experience of a time slice in your distant 
future’. (Ibid., 94). 
3 Paul considers the examples of being a parent and taking on a medical career as extended transformative 
experiences. (Paul (2014), 98-103). 
4 In this essay, Dalferth critiques Kierkegaard for ‘putting the cart before the horse’ (Dalferth (2005), 279). He 
interprets Kierkegaard as suggesting that ‘[i]t is not grace that defines how it is received, but our human receiving 
that defines how grace is received, when it can be received and what is received as grace’. (Ibid., 279). This 
critique is advanced in response to what Dalferth thinks is ‘a deep ambiguity and unresolved tension’ in the 
account of becoming a Christian that we find in Concluding Unscientific Postscript. On the one hand, he 
recognizes that the ‘argument in Postscript depends from the first to the last page on the priority of God’s creative 
grace over our ways of receiving it’. (Ibid., 279). However, on the other hand, he also thinks that Postscript 
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‘presents the spheres of existence as defining what we can see and grasp and understand as God’s presence and 
grace’. (Ibid., 279). 
5 See, for example, Baggar (2007), 28. 
6 For MacKinnon, this is ‘peculiarly uncongenial’ both to the ‘positivist and metaphysical dogmatist’. (Mackinnon 
(1974), 113). 
7 See Kierkegaard’s discourse on Mt. 11:28, ‘Come here to me, all who labor and are burdened, and I will give 
you rest, in CD, 262-267 / SKS, 267-275. 
8 Kierkegaard’s pseudonym, Johannes Climacus indicates that, for a person to come to faith, she will need to 
encounter ‘a believer’s report’ [den Troendes Efterretning]: a report that says something akin to ‘“We have 
believed that in such and such a year the god appeared in the humble form of a servant, lived and taught among 
us, and then died”’. (PF, 104 / SKS 4, 300). What is significant about the witness of a believer is that it presents 
Jesus Christ as the object of faith (rather than, for example, an object of historical-critical study). 
9 See also PC, 140 / SKS 12, 144. I argue this point more fully in my article, ‘Do You Have the Heart to Come to 
Faith? A Look at Anti-Climacus’ Reading of Matthew 11.6’. 
10 Accordingly, Kierkegaard’s pseudonym, Vigilius Haufniensis, notes that the nature of the ‘qualitative leap’ that 
takes place in the fall (in which man falls into a qualitatively different sphere of existence) would be beyond the 
scope of psychological investigation. (CA, 38-41, 47-52 / SKS 4, 344-345, 352-356). 
11 This is how a person who is thinking about becoming a Christian should think about what is required to become 
a Christian. Clearly, not everyone will become a Christian in this way. For example, in Acts, we find a number of 
accounts of conversion that are much more immediate: accounts of converts who did not seem to go through a 
pathos-filled adventure into the unknown. For example: the first converts (Acts 2.37-42), the conversion of Saul 
(Acts 9.1-19), the conversion of Lydia (Acts 16.11-15), and the conversion of the Philippian jailer (Acts 16.27-
40). 
12 To a certain extent, this leap requires a person to ready herself for the unexpected. However, for Kierkegaard, 
a person should also show some restraint. Like MacKinnon, Kierkegaard does not think that a person should exist 
in such a way as to allow herself to be passively overcome by unexpected experiences––a person should not be 
ready to surrender herself to the unexpected ‘as if it were all-embracing revelation’. (MacKinnon (1974), 113). It 
would be unwise for a person to exist in a way that would allow her to become easily carried away by an immediate 
fascination with an unexpected revelation––by something totally unfamiliar. For Kierkegaard, person must have 
a hold on her existence; she must be intentional in her decisions over which direction her life should take (see 
CUP, 311-312 / SKS 7, 283). Nevertheless, upon coming to know God, and upon becoming a Christian who views 
a relationship with God as the absolute telos of her existence, that person must become willing to surrender herself 
wholeheartedly to God. (See CD, 251 / SKS 10, 265). 
13 Kierkegaard writes: ‘Being a Christian is defined not by the “what” of Christianity but by the “how” of the 
Christian.’ (CUP, 610 / SKS 7, 554). This meant not only emphasizing the grace of God in the Christian life but 
also stressing that the Christian must strive to live in a way that takes her relationship with God seriously. The 
Christian must interpret her relationship with God as her eternal happiness; she must commit her life to 
worshipping God, and she must do so with an understanding that she is nothing before God. To become a 
Christian, a person must think about what it means to become a Christian and struggle to act accordingly. When 
she does so, her reflection is not simply the grace of God operating within her. For Climacus, becoming a Christian 
involves grappling with the call of Christianity, and this seems to involve a reciprocal relationship between the 
grace of God and a person’s immanent existence.  
14 As Climacus notes: ‘Awareness is by no means partial to faith, as if faith proceeded as a simple consequence 
of awareness.’ (PF, 93 / SKS 4, 291). 
15 In his analysis of Christianity, in Concluding Unscientific Postscript, Climacus offers quite an existential 
account of Christianity. He notes: ‘the issue is not about the truth of Christianity but about individual’s relation 
to Christianity’. (CUP, 15 / SKS 7, 24). 
16 To understand what Climacus is doing, it is important to be clear that the account of becoming a Christian that 
Climacus advances is primarily directed at himself, as someone asking the question, ‘How can I become a 
Christian?’. 
17 This passage could be seen to find support in James 4:8. 
18 This is also made plain in Philosophical Fragments, in which he puts forward an account of conversion that, in 
Postscript, he associates with Christianity. 
19 When God draws a person into a life of faith, that person will be distinguished from those who do not have 
faith. The problem with this suggestion, as Climacus acknowledges, is that it could be taken to imply that the 
Christian is being given ‘preferential treatment’, and, he notes, ‘if a Christian selfishly perceives it as this, we 
have the desperate arrogation of predestination’. The Christian would seem to be singled out from ‘others who do 
not have or are unable to have preferential treatment’; and this includes ‘the countless ones who are excluded 
through no fault of their own but by the accidental circumstance that Christianity has not yet been proclaimed to 
them’. Climacus does not devote much attention to this issue, but merely states it as a difficulty that arises in a 
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Christian understanding of faith. Also, he does not think that this preferential treatment will immediately come 
across as preferential treatment in this world. By becoming a Christian, a person is drawn into a life that is 
‘distinguished by suffering’ (CUP, 582-583 / SKS 7, 529-530). 
20 Lee Barrett helpfully explains, ‘any preparation for grace could jeopardize the decisiveness of the moment. The 
individual would be grateful to God for the gift of grace, but grateful to oneself for becoming eligible to receive 
the gift. But if the moment is to have decisive significance, the recipient can take no credit for being in a position 
to receive grace. The logic of absolute gratitude, trust, and dependence requires the denigration of the previous 
life situation. Gratitude is maximised if salvation is not only a gift, but also a gift which was neither expected nor 
sought.’ (Barrett (1994), 270). 
21 In a person’s prior sinful existence, Climacus describes, the sinner ‘holds himself captive’ (PF, 17 / SKS 4, 226; 
see also CUP, 208 / SKS 7, 191; CA, 22 / SKS 4, 330; PC, 151 / SKS 12, 155). 
22 Climacus does not develop this point with reference to the work of the Holy Spirit. However, Kierkegaard 
himself asserts that ‘[t]he Spirit brings faith, the faith––that is, faith in the strictest sense of the word, this gift of 
the Holy Spirit’. (FSE, 81 / SKS 13, 103). He also maintains that the Spirit enables us to know God the Son, the 
Mediator, who directs us to God the Father: God ‘becomes my Father in the Mediator by means of the Spirit’. (JP 
2, 1432 / SKS 25, 140–141). 
23 Indeed, Kierkegaard notes that ‘it would be ludicrously confusing to attribute to me everything the poeticized 
personalities [such as Climacus] say’. (JP 6, 6786 / Pap X-6 B 145; see also CUP, 625-630 / SKS 7, 569-567). 
24 For Kierkegaard, ‘The Holy Scriptures are the wayside sign [Veiviseren], Christ is the way’ (KJN 2, 105 / SKS 
20, 105). 
25 Drawing on Jn. 6.45, Kierkegaard notes, ‘God directs us to the Son, to the Mediator’ and pronounces ‘In the 
Mediator I can be a father to you.’ He also notes that the Spirit must help us to know the Son, the Mediator, who 
directs us to the Father: God ‘becomes my Father in the Mediator by means of the Spirit’. (JP 2, 1432 / SKS 25, 
140-142). Kierkegaard also writes: ‘A Mediator is necessary for me, among other reasons, simply to make me 
aware that it is God with whom, as we say, I have the honor of speaking; otherwise a man can easily live on in 
the indolent conceit that he is talking with God, whereas he is only talking with himself. (JP 2, 1424 / SKS 24, 
237). 
26 Kierkegaard does not attempt to offer a systematic account of how we should understand the relationship 
between divine sovereignty and human autonomy. For him, both divine and human agency have a decisive role 
to play in the process of becoming a Christian. However, the question of how exactly the two relate to one another 
is not, for him, something that human beings have the capacity to resolve systematically, by way of their finite 
understanding.  
27 See Kierkegaard’s allusion to Jn. 3:8 in CD, 253 / SKS 10, 267. Although, in certain respects, Kierkegaard 
engages in systematic argument, he does so with a concern to critique overly systematic accounts of Christianity. 
For Kierkegaard, a methodical account of exactly how or why a person becomes a Christian is beyond the scope 
of systematic investigation. ‘Faith is always related to what is not seen; in the setting of nature (in opposition to 
the senses) to what is invisible [Usynlige]; in the setting of spirit (spiritually) to what is improbable 
[Usandsynlige].’ (KJN 4, 74 / SKS 20, 75). 
 Also, in his writings, Kierkegaard does not attempt to offer a precise explanation of how divine and 
human action relate to one another in the process of becoming a Christian. ‘A providence [Forsyn] is no easier to 
understand (to grasp) than redemption [Forløsningen]—both can only be believed.’ (JP 3, 3628 / SKS 27, 349 
emphasis original). 
28 Commenting on passages such as this, C. Stephen Evans notes that Climacus ‘is here speaking 
phenomenologically. When a human being is not spiritually attuned, God is not experienced as real, and in a sense 
God is not real for that person.’ (Evans (2006), 244). I think this is right. However, I would want to qualify that, 
if this is to be understood Christianly, we need to be clear that God is actively involved in the spiritual attuning. 
29 As Kierkegaard’s Christian pseudonym Anti-Climacus presents it, a person discovers what it means to be a self 
when her existence that corresponds to ‘the power that established it’. (SUD, 20-21 / SKS 11, 136-137). 
30 Also, as Kierkegaard himself writes: ‘Man’s highest achievement is to let God be able to help him.’ (JP 1, 54 / 
SKS 27, 569-570; see also JP 2, 1492 / SKS 25, 177). 
31 For Laurie Paul, there is something special about religious experience, which means that it ‘deserves more 
extensive discussion’. (Paul (2014), 104). While she does not offer a more extensive discussion of religious 
experience in her book on Transformative Experience, she does mention that she is working on an article on 
‘Transformative Religious Belief’ that is (still) yet to come out. (Ibid., 104 n. 58). 
32 Although Kierkegaard does qualify: ‘If my relation were to pagans… then in opposition to them I would have 
to say that I am a Christian. But I am living in Christendom, among Christians, or among people who say they are 
Christians.’ (PV, 138-139 / SKS 16, 120). 
33 Kierkegaard writes: ‘God has allowed human beings to be able to work in order to give them an enjoyment, a 
feeling of independence’. (JFY, 185 / SKS 16, 232). After making this point, he provides his well-known 
illustration of the mother who wants to give her child, little Ludvig, the delightful perception that he is pushing 
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the stroller himself. This activity, however, is not one that is possible for Ludvig by himself. So, while the mother 
allows Ludvig to struggle to push the stroller for himself, it is actually her who is the one who has to do the 
pushing from behind. Such a situation, for Kierkegaard, is comparable to the person who struggles to live out the 
Christian life, while it is actually God who is enabling her to live out the Christian life. 
